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Abstract 
Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm we examined the effects of 
perceptual (distinctiveness) and conceptual (backward associative strength) factors 
on the generation of false memories in 5 and 7-year-old children. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the perceptually similar (just black or white pictures) or 
dissimilar condition (alternating black and white with colour pictures). For both 
conditions, these pictures were also high or low in backward associative strength. 
We hypothesised that false memories would be influenced by age, perceptual 
similarity and conceptual factors interacting. Results showed that true memories 
increased with age. False memories in 5 year olds not only extended to categories 
outside of the DRM paradigm but also appeared to be influenced by perceptual 
factors. In controlling for a yes-bias this false memory effect was no longer 
significant. There were no significant main effects or interactions found for false 
memories in 7 year olds. Potential limitations including list lengths and associative 
strength of items were considered and implications for future research were 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
The topic of false memories in both children and adults has interested researchers 
for many years and has become a particular focus due to the implications in the legal 
system (Brainerd, Reyna & Forrest, 2002). One method of generating false 
memories which has been suggested to be a robust measure in both children and 
adults (Wimmer & Howe, 2010) has been termed the Deese/Roediger-Mcdermott 
(DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In the DRM paradigm 
participants are shown a list of words, examples of which include: physician, 
stethoscope, nurse, medicine, patient. In this case, all are associated with the non-
presented item or “critical lure” of “doctor”. When the DRM paradigm for verbal 
information has been implemented, participants have been shown to not only 
remember the presented items (true memories) but also the critical lures (which 
indicate false memories) associated with these items. This has been replicated by 
multiple researchers (e.g. Seamon et al., 2002; Toglia, Neuschatz & Goodwin, 
1999). Ghetti, Qin and Goodman (2002) suggested that by using the DRM paradigm, 
researchers can be fairly positive that participants are experiencing false memories 
rather than being influenced by social pressures, as has been seen in other false 
memory paradigms. It remains unclear from the research exactly which mechanisms 
drive false memories in children; this research was particularly interested in the 
interaction between age, perceptual and conceptual factors.   
How age affects false memories 
Research has suggested that with the DRM paradigm there is a developmental 
reverse, (McGeown, Gray, Robinson & Dewhurst, 2014) in that false memories have 
been seen to increase with age. As an indication of this, Brainerd et al., (2002) found 
that false memories in younger children were nearly at the lowest level in 
comparison to older children and adults. This developmental reverse has further 
been supported by many researchers (Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian & Reyna, 2006; 
Dewhurst, Pursglove & Lewis, 2007; Howe, 2006; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon & 
Plumpton, 2009). In considering the DRM paradigm, one problem with the research 
is that the words used are typically adult-association normed (Nelson, McEvoy, & 
Schreiber, 1999; Nelson, McEvoy & Schreiber, 2004) and therefore false memories 
in children tend to reduce (Wimmer & Howe, 2009). However, main effects have still 
been found with children in these studies. In research using child-normed associative 
lists, this false memory developmental reverse has still been seen (Anastasi & 
Rhodes, 2008; Carneiro, Albuquerque, Fernandez, & Esteves, 2007) suggesting that 
DRM lists for that are adult and child-normed do influence false memories in 
children. 
There have been two main explanations for why the DRM paradigm has shown this 
developmental reverse; fuzzy trace theory (FTT) (Brainerd, Reyna & Ceci, 2008) and 
associative activation theory (AAT) (Howe, 2005; Howe et al., 2009). According to 
FTT at encoding, representations of events are stored in memory using two separate 
traces; verbatim and gist traces (Hedwige, Larøi, Van der Lindon, 2011). Verbatim 
traces encode the surface features of items such as phonological structures of 
words; gist traces encode the overall meaning of items (Wimmer & Howe, 2009). 
Gist traces are thought to be responsible for false memories as children’s ability to 
extract the gist of the information presented to them tends to increase with age. The 
other theory thought to explain this age effect is AAT, which suggests that memory 
for critical lures occurs due to it being activated many times because of its 
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association with the presented items. Wimmer and Howe (2009), suggested that this 
theory considers an idea of activation spreading within a mental lexicon, which was 
also considered in the activation monitoring theory (AMT)(Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott & Gallo, 2001). AMT suggests that when a list of words from the DRM 
paradigm is presented, it can activate nodes in our mental lexicon which then spread 
throughout our semantic system and can activate items that are not related to those 
which have been presented (Anderson & Pirolli, 1984). This ability to create 
automatic associations has been said to increase with age (Kimball & Bjork, 2002). 
In considering how the DRM influences true memories, both FTT and AAT theories 
also predict that these should increase with age (Howe, 2008). In our research we 
would therefore expect to find higher levels of true memories for older rather than 
younger children. 
To further understand the relationship of false memories, we wanted to see if these 
could be extended to items that were closely related in category (related items) to 
the presented items but were not directly associated (as with critical lures). Such 
words included “food” and “cure” which were related in category to the presented 
items but also to the critical lures of  “bread” and “doctor”.   
Within the current research we also wanted to implement the DRM paradigm with 5 
and 7 year olds whose ages were chosen due to the “five to seven year shift” 
(Sameroff & Haith, 1996). It was explained that there is a cognitive developmental 
shift between 5 and 7 year olds, from child-like thinking to more adult forms of 
thought (Davidson, 1998) or as described by Piaget, the shift from pre-operational to 
concrete operational thought (Azzi, 2002).  Therefore, we would expect to see a 
difference in the generation of false memories between 5 and 7 year olds. We 
hypothesised that 7 year olds would have more false memories for the DRM lists 
than 5 year olds due to their developmental ability to automatically make 
associations with the presented items to un-presented items or ‘critical lures’; we 
were also interested in whether this extended to the related distractors.  
How perceptual factors affect false memories 
In contrast to using the DRM paradigm for verbal information, experiments involving 
pictures resulted in false memories reducing across all age groups, due to the stimuli 
being more distinctive (Dodson & Hege, 2005). Different explanations have been 
proposed for why this occurs. One explanation was suggested by Schacter, Israel 
and Racine (1999) and was termed the “distinctiveness heuristic” where participants 
were aware that they had been provided with distinctive information and therefore 
included recollection of these distinctive details when encoding. In retrieval, the 
critical lure could be rejected due to the visual information of studied items being 
distinctive. Ghetti et al. (2002) however, suggested it would be unlikely that young 
children would be able to implement such a decision-based rule when encoding the 
visual information and therefore suggested that another mechanism may well be 
involved. Smith and Hunt (1998) argued that distinctive processing at encoding 
allows for the discrimination between presented (true memories) and un-presented 
items (false memories) at retrieval, due to the specific features being associated with 
presented items; therefore it makes it possible to discriminate these features from 
the un-presented item’s features. In their experiment, Ghetti et al. (2002) tested how 
distinctiveness could influence false memories in children. In one condition words 
were studied alone, in the other, words were accompanied by pictures; the findings 
The Plymouth Student Scientist, 2015, 8, (2), 149-163 
 
[152] 
 
indicated that 5 year olds had more false memories in terms of false recall rates 
compared with older children and adults. They also found that distinctive information 
(words presented with pictures) reduced false memories for all age groups. They 
suggested that their finding of 5 year olds having more false memories compared 
with older children and adults was due to experimental design. In terms of true 
memories, distinctiveness did not influence recall for presented items. 
Distinctiveness as a factor in reducing false memories was measured by Howe 
(2008) who considered these effects in the production of false memories using 
photographs of objects from DRM lists. He tested this with 5, 7 & 11 year olds and 
found that the more distinctive condition reduced false memory effects in all the 
different age groups. In the experimental condition where the background for the 
pictures was not distinctive, older children had more false memories. There were no 
differences found for true recall across all age groups. This was consistent with 
Ghetti et al.’s (2002) findings on true memories.  
The present research tested the effects of distinctiveness on false memories by 
assigning children to either the perceptually similar (just black and white pictures) or 
perceptually dissimilar condition (alternating colour and black and white pictures) in 
which the pictures were presented followed by an auditory presentation of the item. 
Schacter, Cendan, Dodson and Clifford, (2001) and Schacter et al. (1999) found that 
when this presentation of items, followed by the auditory information was presented 
false memories were reduced. Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Smeets and Moritz (2014) 
suggested that by using visual scenes such as pictures it may well be a more 
appropriate way of testing the impact of DRM lists on the activation of false 
memories as they are more related to ‘real-life‘ than using word lists alone.  We did 
not expect the distinctiveness to influence true memories, however we did expect 
false memories to be affected. We therefore hypothesised that the perceptually 
dissimilar condition would reduce false memories across all age groups due to the 
stimuli being more distinctive. 
How conceptual factors affect false memories 
We were interested in the conceptual factor of backward associative strength (BAS) 
and how this might influence false memories in children. BAS was described by 
Deese (1959), (as discussed by Roediger et al., 2001) as the average tendency for 
presented items to elicit the critical lure in a recognition task. Robinson and Roediger 
(1997), on the other hand, suggested that the false memory phenomenon was not 
predicted by the average associative strength but instead was due to the sum of the 
associative strength. In our research, we chose words based on the Roediger et al.’s 
(2001) research, which scored either high or low in both sum and average overall 
BAS. In Roediger et al.’s (2001) research, they found that those items highest in 
BAS which were more strongly associated to the critical lures, were more likely to 
elicit false memories. Increased false memories for high BAS lists has further been 
supported in research including that by Cann, McRae and Katz (2011), and Howe, 
Wimmer and Blease (2009), who found that false memories varied depending on 
differences in BAS, in that high BAS lists elicited more false memories than low BAS. 
In addition, Arndt (2012) examined the effects of forward associative strength (FAS) 
which he described as the associative strength of critical lures to presented items, as 
opposed to associative strength of presented items to critical lures (as is seen in 
BAS). He suggested this to be a potential confounding variable for results in which 
BAS has been shown to affect false memory rates. In controlling for the effects of 
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FAS, he still supported previous research and found high BAS lists created more 
false memories. In also considering true memories alongside false memories, Knott, 
Dewhurst and Howe (2012) found that both false memories and true recognition 
rates were higher for high BAS lists. Hicks and Hancock (2002) also found that lists 
higher in association increased true memories.  
In our present research, we would predict that those lists higher in associative 
strength would have higher true memory rates than low BAS lists. We would also 
hypothesise that words in the high BAS lists would elicit more false memories than 
low BAS lists. 
Rationale 
As previous research has shown, false memories can be influenced by age, 
conceptual and perceptual factors and we have hypothesised how we thought they 
would individually impact false memories. To our knowledge, these factors have not 
been considered in terms of how they might interact and influence false memories 
and whether these are driven more by conceptual or perceptual factors or perhaps 
neither. Dewhurst and Robinson (2004) suggested that younger children’s false 
memories are less likely to be driven by conceptual than perceptual factors, which 
was also supported by Howe’s (2008) research into the effects of distinctiveness on 
false memories. This would suggest that in our research we would expect to see 
false memories being driven more by perceptual factors than conceptual factors, 
particularly in the 5 year olds. However, previous research has also claimed that 
when participants study a large number of items that are either perceptually or 
conceptually related, then false memory rates are said to increase (e.g. Hintzman, 
1988; Koustaal & Schacter, 1997) this suggests that conceptual factors must also 
play in a role in false memory rates. With previous research in mind, our main 
hypothesis was that false memories would be influenced by the factors of age, 
perceptual similarity and conceptual factors interacting. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 178 children, (94 females, 84 males), participated in this experiment: 91, 5 
year olds, (mean age = 5.7 Years, SD= 5 months) and 87, 7 year olds (mean age = 
7. 6 Years, SD= 5 Months). All children were tested following head teacher and 
parental consent and their own assent on the day of testing.  
Design 
A 2 (Perceptual Similarity: High Vs Low) x 2 (Backward Associative Strength (BAS): 
High Vs Low) x 2 (Age: 5 vs 7 year olds) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was used to measure the proportion of yes responses for true presented 
items and un-presented critical lures and related distractors. BAS was manipulated 
within-subjects and perceptual similarity and age were manipulated between-
subjects. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested in a quiet room and conditions were standardised 
throughout, with all viewing the experiment on a laptop. The participants were 
randomly assigned to either the perceptually similar (all pictures black and white) or 
dissimilar condition (pictures alternating between colour and black and white). Within 
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the perceptually dissimilar condition, participants were further randomly allocated to 
complete one of two versions, which either presented a black and white picture 
followed by a coloured image first, or vice versa. This was conducted in order to 
counterbalance the effects of colour pictures followed by black and white pictures. To 
measure the within-subjects factor of BAS, it was split into two levels which included 
high BAS, with the words being strongly associated to bread (M=.27), doctor (M=.33) 
and lion (M=.18) and low BAS with the words being less strongly associated to 
butterfly (M=.06), pen (M=.13) and cup (M=.15) (Roediger et al. 2001) (for further 
BAS values of all items presented, See Appendix A). Children were told that they 
would be shown some pictures and that they should try and remember as much as 
they could. The children were then visually presented with six lists of eleven words 
(selected from DRM lists), accompanied by the sound of each word. The colour of 
the pictures was manipulated by the experimental condition each child was allocated 
to. Following a list of six words, a filler picture of a yellow star would be presented for 
3 seconds before the next set of six words was presented. Once the study phase 
was over, a 3-minute distractor task of playing “Where’s Wally?” was used.  
Following the distractor task, in the recognition phase children were shown 36 
pictures presented in a random order, again the pictures were followed by the sound 
of the words (for examples of pictures presented, see Appendix B). The colour of the 
pictures they were presented with corresponded to the study phase condition they 
had been allocated to. The experimenter asked, “Did we have that one before?” and 
participants would then follow this with a “yes” or “no” response. The pictures 
presented in the recognition phase included 18 previously presented items, six 
critical lures, six related distractors and six unrelated distractors. (For a full list of 
pictures presented, see Appendix A). 
Results 
To test the main hypotheses defined in this research, a 2 (Perceptual Similarity: High 
Vs Low) x 2 (Backward Associative Strength (BAS): High Vs Low) x 2 (Age: 5 vs 7 
year olds) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to measure 
the dependent variable of the proportion of yes responses for true presented items 
and un-presented critical lures and distractor items. 
 
Un-Corrected Scores 
Table 1 presents the mean proportion of yes responses for high and low BAS items 
in 5 and 7 year olds for presented items, critical lures, related and un-related 
distractors. 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, 5 year olds had higher mean proportions of yes 
responses to low BAS presented items, critical lures, related and un-related 
distractors. 7 year olds had higher mean proportions for presented items in terms of 
high BAS lists. These were subjected to analysis. The variability within the data 
differed for the different items, with presented items having the lowest variability 
across both age groups. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Mean proportions of yes responses for Presented Items, Critical lures, Related and 
Un-related distractors. 
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Age In Years 
Backward 
Associative 
Strength 
Presented Critical Lure Related Un-Related 
5 
High BAS .82 (.20) .37 (.38) .23 (.34) .27(.40) 
Low BAS .85 (.16) .36 (.44) .29 (.40) .24(.38) 
      
7 
High BAS .85 (.16) .29 (.32) .11 (.24) .15(.33) 
Low BAS .84 (.12) .26 (.38) .19 (.34) .15(.32) 
Note. Standard Deviations are in Parenthesis. 
  
 
True memories. For true memories the analysis revealed that there were no main 
effects found for age, perceptual similarity, or BAS on the proportion of yes 
responses for presented Items (F(1,174) = .53, p = .47, F(1,174) = .60, p = .44,  
F(1,174) = .93, p = .34., respectively). There was a BAS x Age interaction found 
F(1,174) = 4.53, p = .04, and a t-test analysis revealed an approaching significance 
t(90) = -1.85, p = .07 for 5 year olds, with low BAS (M= .85) lists resulting in more 
true memories than high BAS lists (M= .82). For 7 year olds there was no statistical 
significance of BAS, t(86)= .64, p = .52 (see Figure 1). There were no other 
interactions found (all ps > .05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The means of the Age x BAS approaching significance interaction for 5 and 7 year 
olds for presented items. Error bars represent standard error. 
  
False Memories. False memories were measured by the proportion of yes responses 
to critical lures and related distractors; for the critical lures, there was a main effect 
found for age F(1,174) = 4.19, p = .04. With more proportions of yes responses for 5 
year olds (M= .38) than 7 year olds (M=.27). No main effects were found for 
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perceptual similarity F(1,174) = .87, p = .35 or for BAS F(1,174)= .67, p = .41. An 
Age x Perceptual Similarity interaction was approaching significance  
F(1,174)= 3.70, p = .06, as confirmed by a post hoc analysis F(1,174)= 4.20, p = .04, 
which revealed that this interaction occurred because 5 year olds had more false 
memories in the perceptually similar condition (M=.46) than perceptually dissimilar 
condition (M=.30).There was no significance found between the two conditions of 
perceptual similarity vs perceptual dissimilarity for 7 Year olds, F(1,174) = .48,  
p = .49 (see Figure 2). No other interactions were found for the critical lures (all 
ps > .05).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The means of the Age x Condition Interaction for 5 and 7 year olds in the 
perceptually similar vs dissimilar condition for critical lures. Error bars represent standard 
error. 
 
For the related distractors a main effect was found for age F(1,174)= 6.24,  
p = .01, with 5 year olds having more false memories (M=.27) than 7 year olds 
(M= .15). A main effect for BAS was also found F(1,174) = 19.71, p < .001, with the 
low BAS condition creating more false memories (M = .24) than the high BAS 
condition (M = .18). There was no main effect found for perceptual similarity  
F(1,174)= .89, p = .35 and there were no interactions found (all ps >.05). 
 
Corrected Scores 
In order to control for a yes bias within the results, the unrelated distractor proportion 
of yes responses were deducted from each of the proportion of yes responses for 
the presented items, critical lures and related distractors (Snodgrass & Corwin, 
1988). Again a 2 (Perceptual Similarity: High Vs Low) x 2 (Backward Associative 
Strength (BAS): High Vs Low) x 2 (Age: 5 vs 7 year olds) repeated measures 
ANOVA was used to measure the proportion of yes responses for true presented 
items and un-presented items of critical lures and distractors. 
 
Table 2 presents the mean proportion of yes responses for high and low BAS items 
in 5 and 7 year olds once the proportion of yes-responses to unrelated distractors 
was deducted from the presented items, critical lures and related distractors. 
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Table 2 Mean proportions of yes responses for Corrected Presented Items, Corrected 
Critical Lures and Corrected Related Distractors. 
Age In Years 
Backward 
Associative 
Strength 
Corrected 
Presented 
Corrected Critical 
Lure 
 Corrected 
Related 
5 
High BAS .54 (.49) .10 (.29) .02 (.19) 
Low BAS .61 (.39) .11 (.22) .05 (.19) 
     
7 
High BAS .70 (.42) .14 (.24)   .004 (.13) 
Low BAS .69 (.36) .11 (.22) .03 (.19) 
Note. Standard Deviations are in parenthesis. 
  
As can be seen in Table 2, 5 year olds had higher mean proportion of yes responses 
to corrected related distractors. 7 year olds had higher mean proportions for 
corrected presented and corrected critical lures. These were subjected to analysis. 
The variability within the data varied for the different items, with corrected presented 
items for both age groups having the largest variability and corrected related items 
having the smallest. 
  
True memories. For the corrected true memories, there was a main effect of age on 
the proportion of yes responses for presented items, F(1,174)= 4.89,  p = .03, with 7 
year olds remembering more (M= .69) than 5 year olds (M= .56). There were no 
main effects found for perceptual similarity F(1,174)= 1.45, p =.23 or BAS  
F(1,174)= 2.16, p =. 14. There was a BAS x Age interaction found F(1,174)= 5.52, p 
=.02, this was confirmed by a t-test analysis t(90)=-2.44, p =.02 which revealed that 
this interaction occurred due to 5 year olds having more true memories for low BAS 
items (M=.61) than high BAS (M= .54). There was no significance found for 7 year 
olds t(86)=.44, p =.66 (see Figure 3).  There were no interactions found (all ps >.05). 
 
False memories. For false memories in terms of corrected critical lures there were no 
main effects found for the age, perceptual similarity, or BAS (F(1,174)=.09, p = .76, 
F(1,174)=.05, p =.82, F(1,174)=.01, p = .94., respectively). There were also no 
interactions found (all ps >.05). 
 
For false memories in terms of corrected related distractors there was a main effect 
of BAS found F(1,174) = 7.10, p = .01, with the low BAS corrected related distractors 
creating more false memories (M= .04) than the high BAS corrected condition (M 
= .01). There were no main effects found for perceptual similarity  
F(1,174)=.003, p =.96 or age F(1,174)= .003, p =.96. There were no interactions 
found (all ps >.05). 
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Figure 3: The means of the BAS x Age Group Interaction for 5 and 7 year olds for presented 
corrected items. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Discussion 
True memory findings were consistent with previous developmental research, FTT 
and AAT theories in that true recall increased with age; 7 year olds had more true 
memories than 5 year olds. This was found once the yes-bias had been controlled 
for (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) and the scores had been corrected. The findings 
were also consistent with our predictions. A BAS x Age interaction revealed that 5 
year olds had more true memories for low BAS items, which was found before and 
after the scores were corrected, but not found for 7 year olds. These results were 
inconsistent with previous research, which found that high BAS lists not only 
increase false memories but also true memories (Knott et al., 2012; Hicks & 
Hancock, 2002) but also inconsistent with our predictions. Howe et al. (2009) have 
suggested that true memories are less influenced by associative links between 
presented items and critical lures, and are affected differently by the associations. 
This could be an explanation as to why low BAS items elicited more true memories 
than high BAS lists, as associative strength was playing less of a role in the 
production of true memories. In further support of this, Howe (2009) suggested that 
true memories are not influenced by association but instead by categories, therefore 
it could have been the particular categories of the low BAS items which lead to more 
true memories. This interaction was not found for 7 year olds.   
In considering whether perceptual similarity would have an effect on true memories, 
we did not expect to find any interactions or main effects. Consistent with previous 
research (Ghetti et al. 2002; Howe, 2008) and in line with our predictions, there was 
no significant difference between the perceptually similar and dissimilar conditions 
on the proportion of yes responses to presented items. 
In relation to false memories we were also interested in the proportion of yes 
responses for critical lures; we found that 5 year olds had more false memories than 
7 year olds and that an interaction revealed this was for perceptually similar items. 
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This finding was consistent with previous research by Ghetti et al. (2002) who 
reported that younger children had more false memories than older children and that 
the less distinctive condition created more false memories. With this in mind, it could 
be suggested that in this case, perceptual factors were driving false memories for the 
younger children and distinctiveness was reducing false memories. This is consistent 
with the “distinctiveness heuristic” proposed by Schacter et al. (1999) which 
suggested that participants were aware of the distinctive information and could use 
this in the recognition task realising that they had been provided with distinctive 
information. However, as already mentioned Ghetti et al. (2002) suggested that it 
would be unlikely that young children would be able to implement this heuristic, since 
our finding was for 5 year olds it could be suggested that perhaps it was not the 
ideas of “distinctiveness heuristic” driving false memory rates. By contrast, Smith and 
Hunt (1998) argued that distinctiveness at encoding allows for successful 
discrimination at retrieval of presented and un-presented items and perhaps it was 
this that lead to the perceptually similar condition creating more false memories. 
Although interesting, once the scores had been corrected this interaction 
disappeared, suggesting that the yes-bias was influencing the generation of false 
memories for critical lures in 5 year olds.  
In considering false memories we were also interested in whether these could be 
extended to other items aside from the critical lures. To this end we included related 
distractors which were close in category to the critical lure but less directly 
associated. There was a main effect of BAS found, in that low BAS items generated 
more false memories than high BAS items. The same was true for the corrected 
scores suggesting that false memories can be extended to categories further than 
the associated critical lures. This is however an unexpected finding, as previous 
research has been consistent with the idea that high BAS items normally elicit more 
false memories (Ardnt, 2014; Hicks & Hancock, 2002; Howe et al., 2009; Knott et al., 
2012; Roediger et al., 2001). In considering the data and potential explanations for 
why this unexpected finding occurred, one potential criticism is that there were some 
items in the low BAS lists that had higher associative strength to the critical lure than 
some items in the high BAS lists. Examples included Quill, Saucer & Cocoon, as 
opposed to other in high BAS lists (slice, sick, pride for example). Although the 
average and total overall associative strength was lower for low BAS lists, it may 
have been these higher associative strength items within these lists contributing to 
the false memories. More in-depth analysis of the data would be required to see if 
these items were confounding the results. Roediger et al. (2001) included items in 
their low BAS lists that we did not include in our data. These had lower associative 
strengths to the critical lure and for future research it could be considered that all the 
items within the low BAS lists should have lower associative strength than those in 
the high BAS lists.  
A main effect of age was also found for the related distractors with 5 year olds 
having more false memories than 7 year olds, this may have been due to the fact 
that the related distractors did not have a direct association to the critical lure, but 
were instead related by category.  Howe et al. (2009) suggested that category lists 
should have higher false recall rates than DRM lists for younger children because 
they contain fewer gists. According to FTT, it is the gist traces which encode the 
overall meaning of an item and this ability increases with age. Therefore, if there are 
fewer gists this could explain our finding. Once the scores were corrected however, 
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this main effect disappeared, which again suggests that the yes-bias was influencing 
the results.  
Across the board, there were no main effects or interactions found for 7 year olds. 
This is inconsistent with previous research into the DRM paradigm, which using AAT 
and FTT would predict that 7 year olds would have more false memories than 5 year 
olds (Brainerd, et al., 2006; Dewhurst et al, 2007; Howe, 2006; Howe et al., 2009). 
This was also inconsistent with our predictions. One potential limitation which might 
explain why this occurred was considered by Ghetti et al. (2002). They suggested 
that participants should have enough time to be able to encode and retrieve the 
material they see. There should be limited time for items to be encoded and false 
memories to be elicited, but they cannot exceed the abilities of the young children. 
There was only 3 seconds between each presented list, which may not have been 
enough time for the information to have been encoded by the children.  However, in 
research conducted by Howe (2008), Howe et al. (2009) which used similar timings, 
they still found the developmental reverse, which suggests that perhaps it was not 
the encoding time playing a role in our unexpected results. Another limitation which 
could have influenced our findings was the DRM lists that we used were adult- 
normed, as Roediger et al.’s (2001) word lists were all derived from research 
conducted with undergraduates (e.g. Nelson et al., 1999; Stadler, Roediger & 
McDermott, 1999). Although DRM lists that were child-normed have still seen this 
developmental reverse, (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2008; Carneiro et al., 2007) these 
adult-normed lists may still have reduced false memories in the children (Wimmer & 
Howe, 2009). Anastasi & Rhodes (2008) examined the effects of using adult-word 
norms on children and found that both true and false recall was reduced. Therefore, 
our results may have been affected by using adult-normed lists. For future research, 
our study could be replicated using child-normed lists, to see if this influences our 
results. 
Our main effects for 5 year olds were confounded by the yes-bias. One potential 
reason for this occurrence could be explained by Brainerd et al.’s (2002) research 
into list lengths. They suggested that list lengths need to be long enough for gists to 
be extracted and false memories to be elicited, but not too long as to make the task 
too difficult. Their research found that the list-lengths of 12 items were too cognitively 
demanding for 5 year olds. They arrived at this conclusion due to low levels of true 
recall and recognition found in their results for 5 year olds. We had six lists of eleven 
words and as this was close to the threshold of 12 items it could be suggested that 
perhaps the 5-year olds found the task too difficult; which lead to more of the yes-
bias within our results. 
To conclude, if the yes-bias was not taken into consideration, it would appear that 
perceptual factors were driving the false memories more than conceptual factors. 
This was due to the fact that 5 year olds had more false memories than 7 year olds, 
and that distinctiveness reduced false memories. In terms of conceptual factors, the 
fact that low BAS items elicited more false memories would not suggest that this was 
a factor as consistent research has found high BAS lists elicit more false memories. 
However, taking the yes-bias into consideration, these main effects and interactions 
were not significant; therefore we cannot conclude that perceptual factors drove false 
memories more than conceptual factors. Potential limitations to our methods have 
been considered and in light of future research could be altered accordingly. In 
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addition, this study has highlighted some of the ways in which false memories can be 
influenced and these could have implications within the criminal justice system. 
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